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THE EFFECTS OF LINGUISTIC DISTANCE AND LINGUA FRANCA 
PROFICIENCY ON THE STAKE TAKEN BY ACQUIRERS IN CROSS-BORDER 
ACQUISITIONS 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We study the effects of linguistic distance and lingua franca proficiency on 
the equity stake taken by acquirers from 67 countries in 59,092 acquisition 
targets in 69 host countries. We theorize and find that acquirers take lower 
equity stakes in foreign targets when linguistic distance and differences in 
lingua franca proficiency between them are high, and take higher stakes 
when the combined lingua franca proficiency of the parties is high. We also 
find that linguistic and cultural distance reduce the impact of the combined 
lingua franca proficiency of the parties on the level of equity taken, which 
shows that the effective use of a lingua franca is affected by the native 
tongues and cultures of the parties. Our results clearly demonstrate that 
governance research and international business studies can benefit from 
incorporating language into their explanatory models. 
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INTRODUCTION 
International business (IB) studies economic interdependencies between individuals, 
teams, and firms located in different countries. The distance between these countries is 
therefore a crucial variable in IB (Zaheer, Schomaker and Nachum, 2012). Geographical 
distance was the first distance considered in IB. When it failed to fully account for European 
trade patterns, Beckerman (1956: 38) suggested that it should be complemented with psychic 
distance, which he thought was due in part to “language difficulties.” Johanson and Vahlne 
(1977: 24) made psychic distance the cornerstone of their Uppsala internationalization process 
model, and defined it as “the sum of factors preventing the flow of information to and from the 
market.” These factors included “differences in language, culture, political systems, level of 
education, level of industrial development” (Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975: 308). 
Language differences were thus central to early conceptualizations of distance. 
 In 1988 Kogut and Singh (1988) proposed a convenient way to operationalize cultural 
distance that did not consider other dimensions of psychic distance such as language. 
Researchers started to equate psychic distance with cultural distance and used Kogut and 
Singh’s cultural distance index, based on the four Hofstede (2001) dimensions of culture, to 
measure psychic distance. Thus, while language differences were integral to early concepts of 
psychic distance, they are now seldom explicitly considered. Hence the claim that language 
has become “the forgotten factor in multinational management” (Marschan, Welch & Welch, 
1997). 
 We aim to further reinstate language in the entry mode literature as a crucial factor in 
its own right by considering the effect of linguistic distance and lingua franca proficiency on 
the share of equity taken in international acquisitions. Much of the burgeoning literature on the 
impact of language has used qualitative methods and has focused on intra-firm relationships 
(e.g., Vaara, Tienari, Piekkari & Santti, 2005; Hinds, Neeley, & Cramton, 2014; Śliwa & 
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Johansson, 2014). Yet language also plays a crucial role in the inter-firm interactions that 
characterize a firm’s international expansion. Language differences, for example, are likely to 
significantly impact international acquisitions, as the acquisition process (e.g., target selection, 
negotiations, due diligence, post-deal integration and management) is communication-
intensive (e.g., Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Yet despite its crucial role in inter-firm settings, 
we know of only four large-scale empirical studies that have looked at how language affects 
modes of entry, with only two of those (Lopez-Duarte & Vidal-Suarez, 2010; Demirbag, 
Glaister &Tatoglu 2007) modelling, as we do, the stake a parent takes in an affiliate.1 With the 
exception of Slangen (2011), these studies have not considered the fact that communication in 
international business is increasingly done in a common language different from the parties’ 
native language. This common language, often called lingua franca, is very often English 
(Nickerson, 2005; Boussebaa, Sinha, & Gabriel, 2014; Jeanjean, Stolowy, Erkens, & Yohn, 
2014). The fact that a lingua franca allows for communication even when the parties’ native 
languages are distant from each other raises the interesting question of whether linguistic 
distance still matters in a world in which many international business transactions are 
conducted in English. We therefore investigate the impact of both the linguistic distance 
between the home country of the acquirer and that of the target, and that of their English 
language proficiency. Specifically, using arguments from information economics, we 
hypothesize that both the linguistic distance between the native languages of the home 
countries of the acquirer and of the target and the level of English proficiency in the two 
countries will affect the ownership levels the acquirer takes in the target. In addition, we argue 
that linguistic distance and cultural distance also impact the effectiveness of using a lingua 
franca. This is because how well individuals communicate in the lingua franca is also affected 
                                                          
1  The other two, Dow & Larimo (2011) and Slangen (2011), look at the choice between greenfield and 
acquisitions. 
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by the distance between their native languages and by that between their home country cultures. 
We test our predictions on a sample of 59,092 cross-border acquisitions. Our large number of 
both home and host countries makes our results less likely to be driven by any language or 
country-specific effects.  
We find that linguistic distance is an important element of psychic distance, and that it 
has a separate and complex influence on modes of entry. Hence language should not be 
subsumed, conceptually or empirically, in cultural distance, but clearly merits further 
investigation as a separate factor. Our findings also suggest that previous studies might have 
overestimated the direct effect of linguistic distance by failing to consider the role played by 
English as a lingua franca. Finally, they indicate that the effectiveness of using a lingua franca 
depends on cultural and linguistic differences between the parties. 
 
BACKGROUND 
What determines the equity share taken by an acquirer in a target?  
The equity stake an acquirer takes in a target (for a recent overview see Chari & Chang, 
2009) is a subset of the choice between partial ownership and full ownership of foreign 
affiliates (e.g., Hennart, 1991). Two prominent arguments advanced to explain that level of 
equity hinge on the idea that disturbances in the flow of information between acquirer and 
target create a situation of information asymmetry, and this in turn leads the acquirer to reduce 
its equity stake. As one would expect language to influence such disturbances, it is surprising 
that it has not been explicitly incorporated in either of these arguments.  
The logic underlying the first reason why acquirers may take a smaller stake in a target 
is drawn from the information economics literature. There is often substantial information 
asymmetry between acquirers and targets. Managers and owners of targets have generally a 
better idea of the value of their firms than acquirers do. But they have few incentives to provide 
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information that would lower the value acquirers may place on their firm. Because of this, even 
the truthful information they provide may be discounted by potential acquirers – Akerlof’s 
(1970) lemon problem. Public sources available to potential acquirers may provide only partial, 
or misleading information; not the reliable, in-depth, and private information they need. To 
alleviate this lemon problem sellers need to signal their confidence in the quality of their firms 
(Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993; Hennart & Reddy, 1997). They do this by offering to keep a 
partial stake in their firm. Acquirers can then experience first-hand that the firm is valuable and 
can subsequently decide whether and how much of the remaining stake to buy. The greater the 
level of information asymmetry between acquirers and targets, the more persuasion is likely to 
be needed to reassure acquirers, and hence the higher the share of equity targets will offer to 
hold until the level of information asymmetry has been sufficiently reduced (Chari & Chang, 
2009).  
A second reason why acquirers may prefer to take less equity in a target is the need to 
preserve the post-acquisition incentives of the target’s decision makers. After an acquisition is 
completed comes the hard work of integrating it. Taking full equity in a target would seem to 
be an effective way for acquirers to guarantee that their policies are implemented in the target 
because it gives them the right to make unilateral decisions.2 But high levels of information 
asymmetry between the acquirer and the target make it difficult for an acquirer to implement 
its decisions. High information asymmetry allows the employees of the target to obfuscate and 
to resist implementation. They may argue that changes in circumstances have made the 
acquirer’s directives infeasible or unadvisable, a claim that the acquirer may be unable to 
evaluate. Leaving part of the stake in the hands of the target’s decision-makers can alleviate 
this moral hazard problem. Giving them an equity stake assures that they will cooperate with 
the acquirer and that they will continue to contribute to their firm’s success, since the price they 
                                                          
2 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this point. 
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will get from selling the remaining stake depends on their firm’s performance.3 They will have 
incentives to make use of their tacit knowledge, such as local marketing know-how (Hennart, 
1991). How crucial it is to harness the incentives of the target’s decision-makers should depend 
on how difficult it is for acquirers to obtain the tacit information these decision-makers hold, 
or, in other words, on the extent of information asymmetry between the parties. . 
We have reviewed two reasons why acquirers who have less information than targets 
would want to take a lower stake in an acquisition target. When is this likely to be the case? 
The IB literature has argued that acquirers are likely to be in a situation of information 
asymmetry when they are distant from sellers, because distance disturbs the flow of 
information. The literature on acquisitions has focused on geographic distance (e.g., 
Ragozzino, 2009) and cultural distance (e.g., Malhotra, Sivakumar & Zhu, 2011). Surprisingly, 
with the exception of Demirbag, Glaister and Tatoglu (2007) and Lopez-Duarte and Vidal-
Suarez (2010), who make a different argument based on the level of uncertainty facing the 
acquirer, no study has, as far as we know, theoretically or empirically considered how linguistic 
distance and lingua franca proficiency affect this information asymmetry, and hence the level 
of equity taken by an acquirer in a target. This is surprising given that differences in languages 
are important reasons why information is not transferred, and hence why there is information 
asymmetry.  
 
THEORY 
Linguistic distance and foreign ownership levels 
As we have argued, the owners and managers of acquisition targets have no incentives 
to provide would-be acquirers information that would lower the value of their firms. To reduce 
                                                          
3  This is the case when managers are owners, or when their compensation (e.g. stock options) gives them 
incentives that are in line with those of the owners. 
8 
 
this information asymmetry, potential acquirers need to access reliable, in-depth, and 
privileged information from a variety of sources in the target country. Such information is 
likely to come from individuals with whom one has a trusting relationship. Establishing a 
trusting relationship requires frequent and informal social contacts built over a period of time 
(e.g., Levin & Cross, 2004). Such close social contacts are difficult between individuals who 
do not speak the same language (Welch, Welch & Piekkari, 2005). As a result, one would 
expect language differences to impair the establishment of close relationships, and hence to 
reduce the quantity and quality of information transferred. There is a considerable amount of 
evidence on this point, most of it at the intra-firm level, but applicable to the inter-firm level as 
well. Buckley, Carter, Clegg, and Tan (2005: 55-57), for example, find that communication 
and exchange of important information between parents and foreign subsidiaries was more 
difficult if employees spoke different languages. Mäkelä, Kalla and Piekkari’s (2007) study of 
knowledge sharing in three multinational companies shows that speaking a common language 
(a mother tongue or a lingua franca) leads to a sense of similarity that strengthens interpersonal 
attraction and fosters informal connections. These personal connections lead in turn to greater 
transfer of soft knowledge, insider information for example. Hence one would expect that the 
greater the language barrier between the country of the acquirer and that of the target, the less 
the amount of relevant information transferred, and the greater the information asymmetry 
between the two. This information asymmetry is also relevant in the post-acquisition stage, 
because language barriers will make it difficult for the acquirer to manage the target without 
the inside information held by its existing decision-makers. In that case it makes sense to 
motivate these decision-makers by leaving them an equity stake. In short, language barriers 
generate information asymmetries that increase the benefit of leaving an equity stake with the 
target. 
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A considerable number of people are likely to be involved in this search for information 
which will impact the acquirer’s ownership decision, both from the acquirer’s side (e.g., 
managers from different levels and functional areas, due diligence and legal teams, top 
management teams) and from the target’s side (managers from different levels and functional 
areas, legal teams, top management teams) as well as other relevant parties in the host country 
that can provide information about the target and its environment. Likewise, managing the firm 
after the acquisition will involve many managers from both sides of the deal, gathering and 
exchanging extensive information about the host country and the target firm. While the 
linguistic distance between the acquirer and the target and their lingua franca fluency are best 
measured at the level of the individual, the large numbers involved at various stages of the 
process makes this nearly impossible in a large sample such as ours. Therefore, it makes sense 
in our case to measure these variables by taking the average values of the country of the 
acquirer and of the target. 
How does one measure the height of the language barrier between countries? Some 
studies have introduced the concept of linguistic distance and have measured it by a dummy 
variable equal to one if the interacting parties are based in countries with the same official 
language and zero otherwise (e.g., Davidson & McFetridge, 1985). This measure may discard 
valuable systematic variance. First, in some countries (for example Switzerland, the United 
States, Finland, and Belgium) a significant number of residents speak as first language a 
language also spoken in another country. Second, residents of a country may, besides their 
mother tongue, also speak a learned second language. Most Dutch have learned and speak 
German, reducing the linguistic distance between the Netherlands and Germany. Linguists 
have also shown that the difficulty of learning a foreign language varies in predictable ways. 
Hart-Gonzalez and Lindemann (1993) report language scores for English-speaking Americans 
of average ability after 16 and 24 weeks of language training. These scores show that the 
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fluency attained depends on whether the language they are trying to learn belongs to a different 
or to the same language family, and, in this latter case, to the same or different branches of the 
same family. Languages belong to the same family if they share a common origin, and 
languages that share a common origin tend to have similar syntaxes, and hence are closer and 
generally easier to understand and learn than languages that belong to different families, with 
languages that belong to the same sub-branch of the same family being in some cases mutually 
understandable. One can therefore meaningfully talk of distance between two languages and 
go beyond the simple distinction of two languages being the same or different. Accordingly, 
and following Dow and Karunaratna (2006), we define linguistic distance as made up of three 
elements: (1) the syntactic distance between the official languages spoken in two countries, i.e. 
whether they belong to the same family, to the same branch of the same family, to different 
branches of the same family, or to different families; (2) the proportion of home country 
residents who speak the target country’s language; (3) the proportion of target country residents 
who speak the home country’s language. 
We suggest that the greater the linguistic distance between the home country of the 
acquirer and that of the target, the greater the level of information asymmetry between the 
parties, and hence the greater the benefit of taking a lower stake to reduce the risk of over-
valuing the target and to preserve incentives for the managers of the acquired firm. 
Consequently: 
  
Hypothesis 1: The greater the linguistic distance between the home countries of an 
acquirer and a target, the lower the equity taken by the acquirer in the target. 
 
Lingua franca and its impact on foreign equity levels 
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Two parties with linguistically distant native tongues, and hence who have difficulty 
understanding each other, can opt to use a lingua franca. While Latin and French were used in 
earlier times, “the dominance of English used as a lingua franca in international business 
contexts is now seemingly beyond dispute” (Nickerson, 2005: 367). We expect therefore that 
both the difference between the parties in their English proficiency and their combined English 
proficiency will affect how effectively they can communicate. Each of these factors, holding 
the other constant, should affect communication effectiveness, and hence information 
asymmetry reduction.4 
To understand this, consider the following examples. Assume that partners A and B are 
in countries with English proficiency levels of 1 and 9 while partners C and D reside in 
countries with proficiency levels of 4 and 6. Both pairs have the same combined English 
proficiency score of 10, but the difference in proficiency is 8 for the first pair and 2 for the 
second. We would expect the second pair to communicate better. In other words, the more 
parties differ in their level of English proficiency, keeping their combined English proficiency 
constant, the less effective their communication (e.g., Neeley, 2013; Hinds et al., 2014), and 
the higher the level of information asymmetry, and hence the lower the equity taken by an 
acquirer in a target. Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the difference in English language proficiency between the 
home countries of an acquirer and a target, the lower the equity taken by an acquirer in 
a target. 
  
Assume now that partners E and F are in countries with English proficiency levels of 2 
and 3 and partners G and H are in countries with English proficiency levels of 8 and 9. Both 
                                                          
4 Separating the impact of differences in the attributes of the parties from that of their combined attributes is 
common in dyadic research (e.g., Ahuja, Polidoro, & Mitchell, 2009). 
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pairs have the same difference in English proficiency, i.e., a difference of 1. But their combined 
proficiency is 5 for the first pair and 17 for the second. It is reasonable to think that the second 
pair will find it easier to communicate, because, in spite of possible differences between their 
fluency levels, the overall higher combined level of fluency means that a greater percentage of 
what is being meant by one of the parties will be in sufficiently good English to be understood 
by the other. In other words, the absolute volume of shared meanings will be higher. Hence the 
greater the combined level of English proficiency of the parties, keeping differences in 
proficiency constant, the more effective communication, and the lower the level of information 
asymmetry between them. In such a case the need for letting the target keep a significant equity 
stake should be lower. Hence our second hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the combined English language proficiency in the home 
countries of an acquirer and a target, the higher the equity taken by an acquirer in a 
target. 
 
Factors Moderating the Relationship between English proficiency and level of Equity 
Taken 
We predict in Hypothesis 3 that the partners’ combined English proficiency contributes 
to more effective communication, and thus reduces information asymmetry. We now 
hypothesize that two factors moderate this relationship. The first one is the linguistic distance 
between the native tongues of the lingua franca speakers, while the second is the cultural 
distance between their countries of origin. We discuss these two factors in turn.  
 De Saussure (1983) has argued that the meaning of words in a language can be 
understood only in their context. Because different languages correspond to different contexts, 
speakers using English as a lingua franca may use the same English word to mean different 
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things. For example, Flory (1988, quoted in Chen, Geluykens, & Choi, 2006) relates how the 
English word commitment had different meanings to members of a multilingual research team. 
Similarly, while control means in English the ex-ante direction of behavior, to a French speaker 
it means ex-post verification of results, which is quite different. Furthermore, the grammatical 
structure of a language may also influence the way information comes out in English. Dutch 
and German speakers often sound rude in English because of the less common use of may and 
should in their native tongues (Chen et al, 2006: 683). In other words, the English spoken by 
non-native speakers of English is likely to be influenced by their native tongue, making the 
information transferred potentially ambiguous, with sometimes dramatic consequences. As an 
illustration, the transposition of Dutch grammar into English is one of the causes of the 
deadliest aviation disaster to date, the collision between two 747s on the runway of Tenerife 
airport in 1977. The Dutch pilot radioed “we are now at takeoff”, a direct translation from 
Dutch in which “at takeoff” refers to an action rather than a position. In other words, by “at 
takeoff” the Dutch pilot meant “in the process of taking off.” The controller heard that the 
Dutch pilot was positioned and ready to take off but would await further instructions, and 
replied “OK.” The Dutch pilot then rolled down the runway and collided with a Pan Am plane 
which was sitting on the same runway (Wierzbicka, 2006: 304). More generally, the extent to 
which non-native speakers of English will carry over mother tongue meanings and syntax into 
English, and hence the potential for miscommunication between speakers of English as a lingua 
franca, may depend on the linguistic distance between the mother tongues of the parties. 
Consequently, the higher that linguistic distance, the less their English proficiency will help 
alleviate information asymmetry, and the lower the level of equity taken in a target. In other 
words,  
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Hypothesis 4: The positive relationship between English language proficiency in the 
home countries of an acquirer and a target and the level of equity taken by an acquirer 
in a target is weaker when the linguistic distance between them is larger. 
 
The second moderating factor we consider arises from differences in the home country 
cultures of the two parties. Language conventions reflect culture, and hence the way non-native 
speakers articulate their thoughts in English is likely to be influenced by their native culture. 
As Hofstede (2001: 21) puts it, “In some cultures and subcultures, being polite to the other 
person is more important than supplying objectively correct information; in some, respondents 
will never use no. In a comparative experiment conducted in Iran and England, one out of five 
passersby in Iran pointed a foreigner the way to a place even if that place did not exist; in 
England nobody did this (Collett & O’Shea, 1976: 453).” International aviation, which uses 
English as a lingua franca, offers many examples suggesting that the cultural background of 
the parties leads to miscommunication. In January 1990, Avianca flight 052 ran out of fuel and 
crashed near New York’s Kennedy airport, killing 73 of its 158 passengers. One of the causes 
of the crash was the unwillingness or inability of the Colombian pilots to declare a fuel 
emergency to the air traffic controllers and to request a direct routing to the airport rather than 
the holding pattern they had been ordered to follow. Commenting on this incident, Helmreich 
(1994: 281) notes that “behaviors that may seem inexplicable to US aviators, such as the failure 
[of the co-pilot] to suggest alternative courses of action to the captain or to question ATC [Air 
Traffic Control] instructions, could reflect characteristics of the crew national culture.” He 
suggests that Colombia’s high score in collectivism and power distance may have accounted 
for the unwillingness of the crew to ask ATC for special treatment and to question its 
instructions. This suggests that instances of miscommunications are likely to be more common 
the greater the differences in the national cultures of users of English as a lingua franca. 
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Consequently, cultural distance is expected to weaken the positive relationship between 
English language proficiency and the ability to reduce information asymmetries, and therefore 
the level of equity taken in a target. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The positive relationship between English language proficiency in the 
home countries of an acquirer and a target and the level of equity taken by an acquirer 
in a target is weaker when the cultural distance between them is larger. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample 
Our data are drawn from the Thomson Financial Security Data Corporation (SDC) 
database, which has been frequently used in both domestic and cross-border acquisition 
research. We selected completed cross-border deals and excluded acquisitions of remaining 
stakes, leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, repurchases, and 
privatizations since we are interested in explaining initial stakes taken by acquirers. We also 
excluded deals which involved acquirers or targets from countries for which we were not able 
to calculate linguistic distance and host country uncertainty. Our final sample consists of 
59,092 cross-border acquisitions completed between 1995 and 2012 where the acquirer had no 
prior stake in the target. Our acquirers are in 67 countries and the targets in 69 countries, 
yielding 1,165 unique country-pairs, thus reducing the chance that our results are driven by 
country specific effects.5  
Dependent Variable and Model Specification 
                                                          
5  The usual measure of concentration is the Herfindahl index (HHI) which ranges from 0 (perfectly equal 
distribution) to 1 (a single category accounts for all observations). All HHIs were low: the HHI for acquirer 
countries was 0.12, that for target countries was 0.07 and that for acquirer country-target country pairs was 0.01. 
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Our dependent variable is the percentage of ownership an acquirer takes in a target. 
This measure is bounded between 1 percent (where the acquirer takes the minimum level of 
equity for the deal to classify as an acquisition) and 100 percent (where the acquirer fully 
acquires the target). Consequently we used Tobit regression models to test our hypotheses.  
Independent Variables 
 Linguistic Distance (H1 and H4): To capture the distance between the language of the 
home country of the acquirer and that of the target we used Dow and Karunaratna’s (2006) 
composite linguistic distance scale, which is composed of three items: (1) a five-point scale 
based on the Grimes and Grimes (1996) classification of 6609 languages that captures the 
syntactic distance between the languages of the home countries of the acquirer and the target; 
(2) the incidence of the language of the acquirer’s country in the target’s country; (3) the 
incidence of the language of the target’s country in the acquirer’s country. 
 Combined English Proficiency (H3, H4, and H5) and the Difference in English 
Proficiency between the Acquirer and Target (H2): To measure the English proficiency of the 
acquirer and of the target, and the difference in English proficiency between them, we followed 
Slangen (2011) and used scores from the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) 
published by Educational Testing Services (ETS). TOEFL is the most commonly used English-
language test in the world and measures the examinee’s ability to understand and use spoken 
and written English. TOEFL scores have been used to capture differences in English language 
proficiency (e.g. Dahlin, Weingart & Hinds, 2005; Slangen, 2011), and have been shown to 
correspond closely to English language skills in a business environment (e.g., Wilson, 1989), 
making them a sound measure for our purpose.  
We used the sum of the average TOEFL scores obtained by all examinees in the home 
country of the acquirer and the target to measure the acquirer’s and the target’s combined level 
of English proficiency. The difference in English proficiency between the two parties is the 
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absolute value of the difference between the average TOEFL score obtained by examinees in 
the home country of the acquirer and in that of the target. For countries whose native language 
is English, we used the average test score of native English speakers in calculating these 
measures. 
Cultural Distance (H5): We measured cultural distance using Kogut and Singh’s 
(1988) cultural distance measure, which is based on Hofstede’s (2001) four cultural 
dimensions.6 
Control Variables 
 We controlled for several factors that may influence the level of ownership an acquirer 
takes in the target: (1) geodesic geographic distance, in kilometers, between the capitals of the 
countries of both parties; (2) psychic distance without language, a composite index of other 
aspects of psychic distance based on Dow and Karunaratna’s (2006) dimensions of psychic 
distance, excluding language (i.e., differences in education, industrial development, 
democracy, religion, and political ideology); (3) host country uncertainty using the reverse-
coded International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) composite index, which captures a host 
country’s economic, financial, and political uncertainty (higher values indicate higher levels of 
uncertainty); (4) the acquirer level of diversification and (5) the target level of diversification, 
using count measures of the number of industries (measured at the 4-digit SIC industry code 
level) in which each firm operated; (6) the acquirer industry R&D intensity and (7) the target 
industry R&D intensity, with dummy variables set to one if they operated in industries 
classified as high-tech in previous studies (e.g., Chari & Chang, 2009); (8) the acquirer industry 
                                                          
6 While Kogut and Singh’s index is one of the most commonly used measures of cultural distance in IB, distance 
measures like theirs have been criticized for assuming that the effect of distance in symmetric (e.g., Shenkar, 
2001; Ambos and Håkanson, 2014). We believe that this simplification is reasonable in our context. Namely, in 
our particular setting we are theoretically focusing on how cultural distance (as a moderator) affects two-way 
communication and information exchange between the acquirer and the target ex ante (during the due diligence 
and negotiation stage) and ex post (during the post-acquisition management stage). In this scenario we do not have 
a priori reasons for the moderating effect of distance to be asymmetric (i.e., that distance A-B ≠ distance B-A).  
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marketing intensity and (9) the target industry marketing intensity using dummy variables 
equalling one if the industries of the acquirer and target have high marketing expenditures; (10) 
the number of bidders for the focal target firm; (11) the acquirer’s experience in the target’s 
host country using a count of its previously completed acquisitions and equity joint ventures in 
the host country up to the year preceding the focal deal; (12) the unrelatedness between the 
industries of the acquirer and the target, with a variable equal to one minus the ratio of the 
number of industries in which both firms operate to the total number of distinct industries in 
which they operate; (13) and (14) a dummy variable for whether the acquirer and target are 
service firms. Finally, to control for heterogeneity across years and host countries, we included 
year fixed effects for the year in which the acquisition was announced, and host country fixed 
effects. The latter allows us to control for country-specific factors, such as limits on the stake 
a foreign firm is allowed to take in local firms. 
 
RESULTS 
 Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. The average equity 
stake foreign acquirers take in targets is 87 percent (vs. 89% in Chari and Chang, 2009). The 
correlations do not suggest problems with collinearity. In contrast to studies which have 
focused on a single host or home country (e.g., Dow & Ferencikova, 2010), we do not observe 
problematic levels of correlation between our different distance measures. This is confirmed 
by the variance inflation factors (VIFs) which are well below 10 (Neter, Wasserman & Kutner, 
1985). The interactions are added individually in separate models and not together because 
adding all three interaction terms with the same independent variable together results in severe 
multicollinearity (i.e., individual VIFs above 100, and the average VIF for the model above 
60). 
------------------------------------- 
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Insert Table 1 here 
------------------------------------- 
Table 2 presents the results of the Tobit regression models. Model 1 is the baseline 
model with the control variables. In Models 2 through 4, we add our primary explanatory 
variables one at a time, and in Model 5 we add all three together. In Model 6 we test the 
interaction between the combined English proficiency in the countries of the acquirer and of 
the target and the linguistic distance between them. Finally, in Model 7 we introduce the 
interaction term between the combined English proficiency in the countries of the acquirer and 
the target and the cultural distance between them. The likelihood-ratio tests comparing the 
model with only control variables (Model 1) to the models including the independent variables 
of interest separately and simultaneously (Models 2 through 5) are significant (p < 0.001), 
suggesting that their inclusion increases the explanatory power of our models. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
------------------------------------- 
Model 5 shows a negative and significant (p < 0.001) relationship between linguistic 
distance and the acquirer’s equity stake. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Model 5 also 
shows a negative and significant relationship (p < 0.001) between the difference in the English 
proficiency of speakers in the home countries of the acquirer and the target and an acquirer’s 
equity stake, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. We also find that the combined English 
proficiency in the countries of the acquirer and the target has a significant and positive 
relationship (p < 0.001) with the stake acquirers take in targets, as predicted by Hypothesis 3. 
By calculating the effects of a one standard deviation change in their coefficients (in Model 5), 
we can compare the magnitudes of the effects of linguistic distance, combined English 
proficiency, and the difference in English proficiency with each other, and with several other 
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variables that have received attention in the literature. Linguistic distance has an effect that is 
twice as large as that of cultural distance and three times as large as that of geographic distance. 
Compared to Model 2, the addition in Model 5 of our lingua franca variables, i.e., combined 
English proficiency and difference in English proficiency, reduce the effect of linguistic 
distance to 40% of its original magnitude. This suggests that prior research might have 
overestimated the effect of linguistic distance by not taking into account the English 
proficiency of the parties. The effect of combined English proficiency is more than 3.5 times 
larger than that of the effect of linguistic distance, while the effect of difference in English 
proficiency is 0.85 times that of linguistic distance. The effect of combined English proficiency 
is also 7.8 times larger than that of cultural distance, three times larger than that of 
unrelatedness, and almost twice as large as that of the level of diversification of the target.  
In Hypothesis 4, we predicted that the positive effect of the combined level of English 
proficiency in the home countries of acquirers and targets will be negatively moderated by the 
linguistic distance between their home countries. Model 6 shows that the interaction term is 
negative and significant (p < 0.01), as predicted in Hypothesis 4. 
Finally, we also proposed that the positive effect of the combined English proficiency 
of both parties on the stake taken in a target would be weaker if their home countries were more 
culturally distant. Indeed we find a statistically significant negative interaction term (p < 0.05) 
in Model 7, offering support for Hypothesis 5.7 Graphical representations of our interaction 
effects, which are available upon request, display patterns consistent with our statistical 
inference and provide further support for Hypotheses 4 and 5. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
                                                          
7 A one-standard deviation increase in Linguistic Distance reduces the effect of Combined English Proficiency on 
equity acquired by 17.5 percent, and a one-standard deviation increase in Cultural Distance reduces the effect of 
Combined English Proficiency on equity acquired by 7.5 percent. 
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What is the impact of language and language barriers on international business? Can 
one still speak of language barriers when actors increasingly communicate through a lingua 
franca like English? While these questions have been investigated in an intra-firm context (e.g., 
Frederiksson et al., 2006; Vaara et al., 2005; Neeley, 2013; Hinds et al., 2014), we look at the 
impact of language in inter-firm relationships. Specifically we look at the equity stake taken 
by acquirers in foreign targets. Most previous quantitative studies that have investigated the 
effects of language on governance choices have focused on either a single home country (e.g., 
Spanish firms entering foreign markets for Lopez-Duarte & Vidal-Suarez, 2010) or a single 
host country (e.g., foreign firms entering Turkey for Demirbag, Glaister & Tatoglu, 2007). 
Although they offer valuable insights, looking at language differences from and to a single 
country may lead to results that capture country-specific effects, thus potentially limiting the 
generalizability of the findings. In contrast, our sample includes a wide range of home and host 
countries. More specifically, we look at acquirers based in 67 home countries acquiring targets 
in 69 host countries.  
 We argue that linguistic distance between the countries of the acquirers and those of 
the targets creates information asymmetries, and that leaving a stake to the target is an effective 
response to such asymmetries. As hypothesized, we find that linguistic distance has a negative 
impact on the equity taken by acquirers in targets. This effect is at least as important as that of 
many of the other factors that have received attention in the acquisition literature, and persists 
even when we control for geographic, cultural, and other elements of psychic distance, such as 
differences in education, economic development, political systems and religion. This is 
consistent with other studies that have shown that language has an impact on managerial 
decisions that is separate from that of culture and from that of other dimensions of psychic 
distance (e.g., Dow & Kurunaratna, 2006; Dow & Larimo, 2011). 
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In contrast to previous studies, we take into account the fact that parties in inter-firm 
relationships can use a lingua franca to overcome the problems of dissimilar native tongues. 
We hypothesize that to be able to effectively communicate, parties should have both high and 
similar levels of English fluency, but make no prediction as to which of the two has the larger 
impact. Interestingly, we find that the effect of combined English fluency is greater than that 
of differences in such fluency. Future research may want to investigate whether this is a 
generalizable finding. In any case, entering both the combined English fluency of the parties 
and the difference in their fluency reduces, but does not fully eliminate, the impact of linguistic 
distance. This suggests that while the impact of linguistic distance may have been 
overestimated in prior research, it still remains relevant, even as business transactions are 
increasingly conducted in English. 
We also hypothesize that the effectiveness with which two parties communicate in a 
lingua franca is affected by how much their native tongues and their native cultures differ. Our 
results confirm this intuition: while the combined English proficiency of the acquirer and the 
target tends to reduce information asymmetry, and hence the stake an acquirer takes in a target, 
that effect is weaker when the distance between the languages and the cultures of their home 
countries is greater. These moderating effects suggest that the use of English as a lingua franca 
does not fully abolish the problems caused by speaking different languages, since differences 
in the languages and in the cultures of the parties reduce the effectiveness with which they 
communicate through that lingua franca. These are tentative results, and future research may 
want to delve deeper into this issue, for example by investigating which specific aspects of 
culture impair the effectiveness of communicating through a lingua franca. Nevertheless our 
results suggest that adopting a lingua franca may not significantly improve communication if 
the firm operates in linguistically and culturally distant countries. Future research could 
examine yet other factors that hamper or facilitate the effective use of a lingua franca. While 
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we focus on country-pair factors by looking at two important underlying differences between 
the acquirer’s and the target’s countries, it would be interesting to explore how country-level, 
firm-level, or deal-level factors could also influence the effective use of a lingua franca.  
There are other contexts where information asymmetry is a crucial driver of governance 
choices, and hence where we would expect linguistic distance to have a significant impact. One 
important benefit of joint venturing with local partners is access to tacit country-specific 
information (Hennart, 1991). Since we have shown that language distance makes it more 
difficult for acquirers to access such information, language distance should also be an important 
driver of the choice between greenfield joint ventures and wholly-owned greenfield affiliates. 
Likewise, accessing tacit local knowledge is an important reason for franchising foreign 
operations so one would expect linguistic distance and lingua franca fluency to be important 
drivers of that choice as well. Situations of information asymmetry also arise in the context of 
investing and financing, so the ability to access international sources of capital should be 
negatively affected by linguistic distance and low lingua franca fluency. 
Our findings also have implications for practitioners. In particular, they suggest that 
proficiency in a lingua franca such as English can help overcome the information asymmetry 
that is often present in foreign acquisitions. However they also show that this is not a panacea, 
since cultural and linguistic differences between the parties hinder the effectiveness of using a 
lingua franca. 
Our results are robust to alternative specifications and methodologies but, like any 
study, have limitations. First, our assumption is that linguistic distance is symmetrical, i.e. that 
the ability of a Japanese acquirer to obtain information on a Danish target is the same as that 
of a Danish acquirer vis-à-vis a Japanese target. This may not be the case, and future research 
should address this point. Second, we do not take into account the potential role played by 
external advisors in helping acquirers evaluate targets, although they are less likely to be of 
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help in managing the target post-acquisition. Because SDC does not provide complete data on 
the use by acquirers of external advisors, except for a few major markets such as the US and 
the UK, we were unable to investigate whether they reduce the level of information asymmetry 
between acquirers and targets, allowing acquirers to take a higher equity stake. This is an 
interesting topic for future research. Third, given the large scale of our study, we measured 
language distance and lingua franca fluency at the national level. In research designs that make 
it possible to identify all the relevant parties involved, it would be preferable to use information 
on the language skills of the individuals themselves. 
Our findings clearly show that language plays an important role in international 
acquisitions, and suggest that its impact on international modes of entry, and in international 
business studies in general, deserves further investigation. We hope to have shown that 
language plays an important role in the governance of inter-firm relationships, and that this role 
deserves further study. 
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
  Variables Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Percentage Equity Acquired 86.71 26.96                   
2 Linguistic Distance -1.38 1.72 -.14                  
3 Combined English Proficiency 467.55 20.29 .18 -.20                 
4 Difference English Proficiency Acquirer & Target 10.49 13.67 -.17 .59 -.41                
5 Acquirer Diversification 3.65 3.30 .00 .06 -.06 .09               
6 Target Diversification 2.18 1.73 -.07 .03 -.05 .00 .14              
7 Acquirer Industry R&D Intensity 0.44 0.50 .16 -.04 .04 -.02 .07 .00             
8 Target Industry R&D Intensity 0.45 0.50 .09 -.05 .03 -.03 .01 .02 .64            
9 Acquirer Industry Marketing Intensity 0.40 0.49 .10 -.04 .06 -.04 .02 .00 .29 .20           
10 Target Industry Marketing Intensity 0.43 0.50 .07 -.04 .06 -.03 -.01 .02 .19 .27 .55          
11 Acquirer Service Firm 0.48 0.50 -.05 -.06 .03 -.04 -.24 -.03 -.03 .06 .13 .12         
12 Target Service Firm 0.47 0.50 .04 -.08 .06 -.06 -.12 -.12 .10 .07 .16 .20 .59        
13 Acquirer Country-specific Experience 0.71 2.30 .02 -.10 .00 -.05 .18 .02 .01 .02 .01 .01 -.03 .02       
14 Number of bidders 1.00 0.04 .00 -.02 .01 -.01 .01 .01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 .01      
15 Host Country Uncertainty 21.14 6.35 -.14 .10 -.36 .07 .02 .06 -.08 -.06 -.05 -.04 -.03 -.06 .01 -.01     
16 Unrelatedness 0.73 0.35 -.06 .01 .00 .04 .18 -.03 -.05 -.02 -.09 -.04 .01 -.02 .07 .01 -.04    
17 Psychic Distance without Language 1.32 1.49 -.18 .19 -.32 .14 .02 .04 -.05 -.04 -.04 -.04 -.03 -.06 -.08 .00 .41 -.01   
18 Geographical Distance 5004.38 4595.62 -.08 -.07 -.23 .06 .06 .01 .05 .05 .01 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.01 .01 .17 .04 .28  
19 Cultural Distance 1.50 1.47 -.15 .64 -.21 .47 .05 .02 -.04 -.04 -.05 -.05 -.05 -.07 -.07 -.01 .17 .02 .36 .09 
 
N = 59092. All correlations are significant at p < .01. 
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TABLE 2: Results of Tobit Models Predicting Percentage of Equity Acquired 
Variables   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant  110.936 *** 103.910 *** 116.836 *** -189.375 *** -146.138 *** -138.238 *** -176.377 *** 
  (11.665)  (11.656)  (11.586)  (17.561)  (18.269)  (18.456)  (23.468)  
Acquirer Diversification  -0.010  0.074  0.178  0.218  0.307 * 0.292 * 0.300 * 
  (0.133)  (0.134)  (0.134)  (0.134)  (0.134)  (0.134)  (0.134)  
Target Diversification  -3.340 *** -3.355 *** -3.349 *** -3.381 *** -3.385 *** -3.380 *** -3.385 *** 
  (0.231)  (0.231)  (0.230)  (0.229)  (0.229)  (0.229)  (0.229)  
Acquirer Industry R&D Intensity  27.608 *** 27.698 *** 27.604 *** 27.637 *** 27.671 *** 27.665 *** 27.663 *** 
  (1.172)  (1.171)  (1.168)  (1.164)  (1.163)  (1.164)  (1.164)  
Target Industry R&D Intensity  -1.601  -1.668  -1.687  -1.632  -1.698  -1.705  -1.703  
  (1.122)  (1.121)  (1.118)  (1.114)  (1.113)  (1.113)  (1.113)  
Acquirer Industry Marketing Intensity  11.186 *** 11.115 *** 10.859 *** 10.664 *** 10.555 *** 10.553 *** 10.541 *** 
  (1.067)  (1.066)  (1.063)  (1.059)  (1.058)  (1.058)  (1.058)  
Target Industry Marketing Intensity  2.136 * 2.211 * 2.229 * 2.067 * 2.146 * 2.152 * 2.163 * 
  (1.040)  (1.040)  (1.037)  (1.033)  (1.032)  (1.032)  (1.032)  
Acquirer Service Firm  -14.947 *** -15.134 *** -14.419 *** -14.550 *** -14.435 *** -14.472 *** -14.459 *** 
  (1.076)  (1.075)  (1.073)  (1.068)  (1.068)  (1.068)  (1.068)  
Target Service Firm  8.221 *** 7.921 *** 7.832 *** 7.427 *** 7.235 *** 7.280 *** 7.239 *** 
  (1.064)  (1.064)  (1.061)  (1.056)  (1.056)  (1.056)  (1.056)  
Acquirer Country-specific Experience  -0.726 *** -0.787 *** -0.707 *** -0.649 ** -0.677 ** -0.695 *** -0.690 *** 
  (0.197)  (0.197)  (0.197)  (0.196)  (0.197)  (0.196)  (0.197)  
Number of bidders  9.628  8.711  8.040  7.694  6.882  6.895  6.900  
  (10.274)  (10.247)  (10.186)  (10.127)  (10.098)  (10.102)  (10.100)  
Host Country Uncertainty  -0.241 † -0.265 † -0.199  -0.030  -0.054  -0.003  -0.034  
  (0.136)  (0.136)  (0.136)  (0.136)  (0.136)  (0.137)  (0.136)  
Unrelatedness  -10.641 *** -10.636 *** -10.594 *** -10.539 *** -10.527 *** -10.597 *** -10.580 *** 
  (1.270)  (1.268)  (1.265)  (1.258)  (1.257)  (1.258)  (1.258)  
Psychic Distance without Language  -1.961 *** -2.142 *** -2.593 *** -1.967 *** -2.330 *** -2.445 *** -2.457 *** 
  (0.474)  (0.473)  (0.474)  (0.467)  (0.469)  (0.470)  (0.472)  
Geographical Distance  -4.2E-04 *** -4.1E-04 *** -2.9E-04 * -2.5E-04 * -2.1E-04 † -2.2E-04 † -2.0E-04 † 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Cultural Distance  -3.423 *** -0.980 * -1.372 *** -2.812 *** -0.953 * -0.966 * 13.322 † 
  (0.359)  (0.430)  (0.382)  (0.356)  (0.431)  (0.431)  (6.961)  
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(continued)   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Linguistic Distance H1   -4.420 ***     -1.785 *** 22.857 ** -1.757 *** 
    (0.430)      (0.459)  (8.225)  (0.459)  
Difference English Proficiency Acquirer and Target H2     -0.569 ***   -0.262 *** -0.263 *** -0.274 *** 
      (0.037)    (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042)  
Combined English Proficiency (sum) H3       0.634 *** 0.543 *** 0.523 *** 0.607 *** 
        (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.044)  
Combined English Proficiency H4           -0.053 **   
 x Linguistic Distance            (0.018)    
Combined English Proficiency H5             -0.031 * 
x Cultural Distance              (0.015)  
Year Effects  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Target Country Effects   Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
                                
Number of Observations  59092  59092  59092  59092  59092  59092  59092  
Log-Likelihood  -95563.4  -95510.6  -95448.4  -95307.9  -95268.6  -95264.1  -95266.5  
Chi-squared   8593.0 *** 8698.7 *** 8823.0 *** 9104.1 *** 9182.6 *** 9191.6 *** 9186.8 *** 
Chi-squared change relative to Model 1    105.6 *** 229.9 *** 511.0 *** 589.6 *** 598.6 *** 593.8 *** 
 
All tests are two-tailed: † p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001. 
 
